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According to C&W, sentence (1) is made up of just one proposi-
tion, but sentence (2) is made up of two. The idea seems to be that
in sentence (1) the boy is simultaneously hugging the girl and the
baby (the three are squeezed into one bear hug), but in sentence
(2) the boy hugs a girl and also kisses a baby (but notice he could
do both at the same time; he could be hugging both, but kissing
only the baby). The claim that there is only one proposition in sen-
tence (1) assumes that comprehenders create a particular mental
model for the sentence, one in which a boy hugs both a girl and a
baby at the same time. The meaning of the sentence is also com-
patible, though, with a situation in which the boy hugs the girl and
then he hugs the baby, in which case clearly the sentence contains
two propositions. It could even be argued that the sentence con-
tains two propositions even in the simultaneous case, because the
representation indicating the meaning of the sentence has to in-
dicate somewhere what agent acted on the baby. The point here
is not that the analysis assumed by C&W is wrong but rather that
their position requires a set of assumptions that are vulnerable to
challenge and so must be explained in more detail.
I will end by repeating that I generally like the approach the au-
thors take in this work. Recently we have begun examining how
unimpaired undergraduates interpret unambiguous sentences
such as The lawyer was sued by the doctor and The dentist was
pulled by the tooth. We are finding striking evidence that sen-
tences that are implausible by virtue of world knowledge – in the
authors’ terminology, by post-interpretive processing – are
processed quite differently from sentences whose sensibility can
be ruled out based on feature mismatch (a tooth cannot be an
agent because agency requires animacy). Even more intriguing is
our finding that, if the two participants in an implausible event
(e.g., The lawyers were sued by the doctor) differ on some gram-
matical feature (plurality in this case), confusion occurs much less
often than when the noun phrases cannot be distinguished with a
grammatical feature. We believe the distinguishing features allow
the two noun phrases to be unambiguously bound to their appro-
priate thematic roles, and as a result misinterpretations are much
less likely to occur (the two noun phrases cannot swap positions).
Data of this sort provide independent and compelling evidence
for the original and creative theoretical perspective C&W present
in their target article, because they require an explanation that as-
sumes a separation between processes that compute interpreta-
tions and so are internal to the language system, and processes 
that evaluate and modify those interpretations and are therefore
external to the system.
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Abstract: This commentary considers how far one can go in making in-
ferences about functional modularity or segregation, based on the sorts of
analyses used by Caplan & Waters in relation to the underlying neuronal
infrastructure. Specifically, an attempt is made to relate the “functionalist”
approach adopted in the target article to “neuroreductionist” perspectives
on the same issue.
Caplan & Waters (C&W) provide compelling arguments in sup-
port of the notion that there is a separate working memory system
for assigning the syntactic structure of a sentence by noting that
there is no interaction between structural complexity and other
processes that require working memory. This is a nice example 
of a general approach to inferring something about the cognitive
architecture of a system given only its outputs (responses) to in-
puts or stimuli that can be manipulated over a number of dimen-
sions. The approach is related to Sternberg’s revision of Donder’s
subtractive method (Sternberg 1969) in which the interactions
among various processes are used to infer something about their
functional organization. Both depend critically on interactions,
and it is this theme that will be pursued in the context of neuro-
biologically motivated analyses of functional anatomy. The key
question, addressed by C&W, is whether the mnemonic aspects 
of interpretive sentence processing are modular or functionally
dissociable from other (e.g., post-interpretive) aspects. This ques-
tion is purely functionalist but implies the existence of distinct
neuronal systems that mediate this processing. An explicit version
of the same question is “Is there functional segregation, in terms
of neuronal systems, for the structural complexity of sentences?”
Much is invested in the term “functional segregation” here, and 
it is worthwhile considering what it means.
The brain appears to adhere to two principles of organization,
functional segregation (Phillips et al. 1984) and the functional in-
tegration of segregated systems, such as cortical areas, subareas,
neuronal populations or individual cells. “Functional segregation”
refers to the selective neuronal responses to specific sensorimotor
attributes. Consider the cortical area V5, a motion-sensitive area
(Zeki et al. 1991) that can be characterized in terms of population
responses (as measured with fMRI or local field potentials with
electrode recordings) to visual stimuli. To demonstrate functional
specialization for motion, one would have to show a high degree
of mutual information between V5 responses and visual motion.
For this area to be functionally segregated, there is a further re-
quirement that there are no responses to other attributes, such as
changes in colour. This constraint has important consequences for
the context sensitivity of speed-dependent responses: imagine
that we characterised the receptive field f(s,l) of a V5 cell as a
function of stimulus speed (s) and wavelength (l). Under segre-
gation, the responses (x) over different speeds should be the same
for any two wavelengths:
x 5 f(s,l1) 5 f(s,l2) 5 f(s).
In short, the speed-dependent responses would be insensitive to the
colour of the stimulus. In other words, functional segregation for a
specific attribute implies that the same responses will be elicited by
changes in that attribute irrespective of the other stimulus attrib-
utes (or more generally the context). Imagine that we measured the
response of V5 to a changes in speed using long-wavelength (red)
stimuli and short-wavelength (blue) stimuli. If we found a response
difference (i.e., a context-sensitive, speed-dependent response),
then functional segregation for motion per se has to be rejected and
we would infer that this area preferred red (or blue) motion (see
Fig. 1 for a schematic illustration of the receptive fields implied by
these situations). This context sensitivity is simply revealed by the
interaction between speed and wavelength in predicting the re-
sponse. Precisely the same construct is used by C&W. In their for-
mulation the response is in terms of speed and accuracy of sentence
processing and the stimulus attribute of interest is structural com-
plexity. They have examined the complexity-dependent responses
(low vs. high) in two contexts to see if there was an interaction. Fail-
ing to find an interaction allows them to assert that functional seg-
regation is a sufficient model for the observed findings. The two
contexts were low and high concurrent working memory load or
subjects with low and high capacity.
The above argument suggests that functional segregation
should involve a series of simple subtractions in different contexts
in order to demonstrate the context-invariant nature of selective
responses. In functional neuroimaging this is the tenet of “con-
junction analyses” (Price & Friston 1997). A conjunction is de-
fined as the presence of a main effect (e.g., of structural complex-
ity) in the absence of interactions (e.g., with memory load). It
would be interesting to revisit this issue with functional neu-
roimaging using a factorial design wherein structural complexity
(high and low) was crossed with memory load (sub- and supra-
span). It is possible that some brain regions would show functional
segregation for complexity (as identified with a conjunction analy-
sis). However, it is likely that some regions would show regionally
specific interactions, speaking to the integration between inter-
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by digit recall. Finding such effects would not detract from infer-
ences about segregation in other brain areas but would speak to
the integration, or coordination, of segregated processing systems
(Friston et al. 1996). Although, to my knowledge this experiment
has never been carried out, it seems extremely well justified by the
psychological background provided in Caplan & Waters.
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Abstract: We discuss several issues raised by Caplan & Waters’s distinc-
tion between interpretative and post-interpretative processes in sentence
comprehension, including the nature and properties of the two systems,
problems with measuring their respective capacities, and the relationship
between the hypothesized separate-language-interpretation-resource
(SLIR) and the general verbal working memory system that supports post-
interpretive processing.
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Figure 1 (Friston). Schematic to illustrate the relationship be-
tween interactions and context-sensitive responses. The upper
panel shows the response of a neuronal system to changes in some
attribute to which it is sensitive. In this instance the responses are
insensitive to the context (i.e., there are no interactions between
attribute and context. Conversely the responses in the lower panel
evidence strong interactions and context-sensitivity. These re-
sponse profiles can be thought of as “receptive fields.”
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